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Abstract
Background. 3-D Secure 2.0 (3DS 2.0) is an iden-
tity federation protocol authenticating the payment
initiator for credit card transactions on the Web.
Aim. We aim to quantify the impact of factors used
by 3DS 2.0 in its fraud-detection decision making
process.
Method.
We ran credit card transactions with two Web
sites systematically manipulating the nominal IVs
machine data, value, region, and website. We mea-
sured whether the user was challenged with an au-
thentication, whether the transaction was declined,
and whether the card was blocked as nominal DVs.
Results. While website and card largely did not
show a significant impact on any outcome, ma-
chine data, value and region did.
A change in machine data, region or value made
it 5-7 times as likely to be challenged with password
authentication. However, even in a foreign region
with another factor being changed, the overall like-
lihood of being challenged only reached 60%.
When in the card’s home region, a transaction
will be rarely declined (< 5% in control, 40% with
one factor changed). However, in a region foreign
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to the card the system will more likely decline trans-
actions anyway (about 60%) and any change in ma-
chine data or value will lead to a near-certain de-
clined transaction.
The region was the only significant predictor for
a card being blocked (OR= 3).
Conclusions. We found that the decisions to chal-
lenge the user with a password authentication, to de-
cline a transaction and to block a card are governed
by different weightings. 3DS 2.0 is most likely to
decline transactions, especially in a foreign region.
It is less likely to challenge users with password
authentication, even if machine data or value are
changed.
1 Introduction
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) is a mainstay
of today’s Internet, allowing users to buy or sell
goods online. In payment systems terminology, e-
commerce payments are known as Card Not Present
(CNP) payments because the cardholder is not
physically present at the merchant. CNP payment
sales have shown a significant growth year-by-year.
For example, in the UK, sales has been recorded a
total of £154 billion for 2017 [1]. This is 18% of
increase in the online spending by customers when
compared to year 2014 [1].
The convenience of enabling purchases online
comes at a price. The system is also prone to at-
tract cyber offenders. Shown in 1, are the UK card
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payment fraud statistics from year 1998 to 2016. It
can be seen from the figure that the payment in-
dustry is effective in mitigating card present types
of payment card frauds. However, CNP payments
fraud has reached its highest mark accounting for
70% of the total card fraud, causing £432.3 million
loss exclusively on the UK issued cards [2]. This
development has called for a complex fraud detec-
tion system to be integrated with the protocol flows
of the CNP payment system.
In general, the CNP payment system requires the
payment initiator (customer) to enter their payment
card information on the checkout page provided by
the merchant website. The merchant collects the
card information, combines it with the transactions
information and forwards it to the card issuing bank
for authorization. During the authorization process,
the card issuer decides whether to approve or de-
cline the transaction.
Given that the payment card details are static and
are shared with every online merchant, there is a sig-
nificant risk of the card data leaking and being used
in fraudulent transactions. Once the payment card
details leaves the payment initiator’s device, there
is no guarantee that the card details are handled se-
curely by the merchants. This is also reflected by
recent attacks on Ticketmaster [3] and British Air-
ways [4, 5] and hundreds of websites where millions
of card details were compromised [6]. Such systems
lacks in the verification of the payment initiator as
the valid owner of the card. Hence, the CNP pay-
ment system in itself is based on static card infor-
mation and, as such, inherently insecure.
To protect the CNP payment system from fraud,
VisaInc [7] introduced 3-D Secure 1.0 (3DS 1.0) [8]
in 2001. 3-D Secure introduced the concept of
payment initiator authentication for CNP payments.
3DS 1.0 redirects CNP transactions from each mer-
chant website to the card issuer so that the payment
initiator can be authenticated as the valid owner of
the card.
With criticisms voiced on 3DS 1.0’s registra-
tion and password authentication [9], frictions in
the checkout [9], and the steady increase in CNP
payment fraud, especially through phishing [10,
9], there was a need for a payment protocol up-
grade. In 2016, EMVCo—a consortium of card
payment networks—developed the 3D Secure 2.0
(3DS 2.0) [11] to address the requirements of
stronger customer authentication yet maintaining
the convenience requirements on a merchant check-
out page. With 3DS 2.0, the card issuer performs
fraud risk assessment for each transaction and au-
thenticates the payment initiator with either of the
two schemes: challenged and frictionless. Chal-
lenged authentication is designed for higher risks
transactions and requires the payment initiator to
authenticate him/herself with one-time pass codes
sent by the card issuer to the payment initiator’s
registered device [11]. Frictionless authentication is
for purchases with lower risk of fraud and relies on
the browser configuration details (hereafter referred
to as browser fingerprint) extracted for the payment
initiator device during the checkout process [11]. At
the same time, the decision making process of 3DS
2.0 to perform fraud risk assessment and the deci-
sion for challenged or frictionless authentication is
shrouded from and often obscure to the consumers.
In this paper, we quantify the impact of fac-
tors used by 3DS 2.0 in its fraud-detection deci-
sion making process. That is, we aim at estab-
lishing to what extent a change in a factor changes
the likelihood of a 3DS 2.0 decision outcome, e.g.,
whether the authentication is made challenged or
frictionless. We run transactions with two Web sites
manipulating Independent Variables (IV’s) which
includes machine data captured from a user Web
browser (WB), transaction value, region and web-
sites. To manipulate machine data, we set-up an
HTTP proxy in the machine used to initiate transac-
tions on 3DS 2.0 website. We measure whether the
payment initiator was challenged with an authenti-
cation, whether the transaction was accepted with
frictionless authentication or declined, and whether
the card was blocked. We employ logistic regres-
sions to quantify the change of likelihood observed
from changes in the variables we have manipulated
and, thereby, shine a light on the 3DS 2.0 fraud de-
cision making process in the backend.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of the 3DS 2.0 transaction
process and provides an introduction into how the
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Figure 1: UK Card Fraud by Type from year 1998 to 2016.
transaction risk assessment decisions are made by
the card issuer. The paper follows an empirical-
methods standard structure thereafter, describing
the method first (Section 5), establishing the core
results of the analysis without further interpretation
(Section 6), and finally analyzing the results in a dis-
cussion (Section 7). We draw attention to the logis-
tic regression plots on pp. 10 and 13 as main tools
to interpret the results.
2 Overview of a 3DS 2.0 Transaction
Process
Figure 2 shows actions and parties involved in a
3DS 2.0 transaction process. The process starts with
the payment initiator filling their payment card de-
tails on the checkout page provided by the merchant
web site. When the “Pay” button is clicked, the
merchant web server hosting the 3DS 2.0 plugin
generates a unique transaction ID and connects the
payment initiator’s session to the card issuer. As
shown in step 4, the card issuer connects to the pay-
ment initiator’s Web Browser (WB) and sends de-
vice fingerprinting JavaScript (dfp.js) programmed
to fetch browser and operating system details. The
JavaScript mainly includes the following methods:
• deviceprint browser(): This method extracts
information about payment initiator’s (WB)
and operating system including: browser
name, major and minor version, languages
supported, languages installed, operating sys-
tem name, operating system version, and oper-
ating system platform (Win32 or Win64).
• deviceprint display(): This method captures
detailed screen information including colour
depth, screen width, height, available height,
buffer depth, and pixel depth.
• deviceprint software(): captures (WB’S) plu-
gins and their types. The method also has
logic to extract browser’s tracking and adver-
tisement preferences as provided by DoNot-
Track and Useofadblock.
• deviceprint java(): is used to test if the pay-
ment initiator browser supports Java or not.
• cookies(): is used to test if cookies are enabled
by the user WB.
The information collected from the above methods
is combined into a single string and is encoded into
base-64 plain text (as defined by the 3DS 2.0 proto-
col specifications [11]) before being sent as a form
element to the card issuer. It is likely that the card
issuer uses IP address as an indicator to extract pay-
ment initiator machine location but it is captured
differently.
In step 8, the merchant frames an Authentica-
tion Request (AReq) which is forwarded to the ap-
propriate card issuer Access Control Server (ACS).
3
:Payment Initiator :Merchant Card Issuer :Authorization
1. Pay / https
2. Enable 3DS 2.0
activate3ds()
3. Connect ACS+POST[Tr.Num]
4. Connect ACS+POST[Transaction Number]+Cookies
5. Load [dfp.js,SessionCookie]+Cookies
6. dfp.js
7. POST[3DS Server Transaction ID, dfp.js (data)+Cookies]
Tunnel(Customer,ACS) Frictionless Authentication Method
8. AReq
9. Challenge
10. AResp
11. CReq
12. Challenge(OTP)
13. Enter OTP
14. Challenge Response(OTP)
15. Determine Challenge
Response
Loop Challenged Authentication Method
16. RReq
17. Receive and
Log
18. RRes
19. CResp
20. Authorization
...X. Accept
Figure 2: Actions and parties involved in a 3DS 2.0 transaction process
The ACS manages 3DS 2.0 authentication re-
quest/response messages. The AReq contains card
data provided by the payment initiator, merchant ac-
count information and other transaction related in-
formation. The card issuer collates the transaction
information from the merchant and WB details pro-
vided by device fingerprinting scrips and performs
fraud risk assessment (FRA) on the given transac-
tion. Based on the outcome of FRA, the card is-
suer decides whether to challenge the payment ini-
tiator with a one-time pass codes or to authenticate
the payment initiator with frictionless authentica-
tion. For the transaction shown in 2, the card issuer
decides to have challenged authentication.
In step 10, the issuer through the Authentica-
tion Response (ARes) message responds back to the
merchant indicating that the challenge is required to
further process the transaction. For frictionless au-
thentication, ARes will indicate a successful authen-
tication.
The merchant initiates a Challenge Request
(CReq) message and posts it to the card issuer. The
issuer sends a challenge user interface (UI) to the
payment initiator’s WB. The UI is an interaction
platform where the card issuer can interact with the
payment initiator to obtain challenge response. At
the point, the card issuer prompts challenge or OTP
on the payment initiator’s registered device (mobile
phone for example).
The payment initiator enters the OTP on the 3DS
2.0 interface and upon successful authentication, the
issuer determines the payment initiator as appropri-
ate owner of the card and formats the Results Re-
quest (RReq) message with a cryptographic hash
which is forwarded to the merchant. The RReq and
the hash is later used by the Authorization network
to verify the integrity of authentication messages.
To acknowledge the receipt of the RReq, the mer-
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Figure 3: Screenshot of Fiddler proxy tool
chant prepares the Results Response (RRes) and
forwards it to the issuer. Finally, the issuer formats
the Challenge Response (CRes) message and shut-
tles it back to the merchant. The CRes indicates the
completion of challenged authentication. It is to be
noted that the CReq and CRes messages are only
applicable to challenged 3DS2.0 transaction.
3 Aims
RQ 1 (Impact of predictors on authentication out-
comes). Which factors impact the fraud-detection
decisions with what magnitude of change in accep-
tance likelihood?
Table 1 gives an overview of the operationaliza-
tion of this research question. As nominal indepen-
dent variables (IV) we have machine data, value,
region, and website.
As nominal dependent variables we consider
whether the user was challenged with a password
authentication, whether the transaction was de-
clined1 and whether the card was blocked.
Iterating over the independent variables X ∈ {
machine data, value, region, website } and the
1In the pre-registration of the experiment, the IV declined
was called transaction status.
dependent variables Y ∈ { challenged, declined,
blocked }, we consider the following statistical hy-
potheses:
Alternative Hypotheses. H1,X ,Y : The independent
variable X systematically impacts the likeli-
hood of a change in the dependent variable Y .
Null Hypotheses. H0,X ,Y : The independent vari-
able X does not yield an impact on the like-
lihood of change in the dependent variable Y .
Note that we, thereby, investigate 5× 3 relations
with corresponding alternative and null hypotheses.
Our main interest lays in the IVs { machine data,
value, region }.
Logistic Regression Classifier. We use logistic
regressions to establish the magnitude of impact on
the likelihood on change in the response variable.
4 Experiments
In a repeated-measures experiment, four different
payment cards (including three Visa and a Master-
Card) were used to make CNP payment transactions
with two different Web sites that supports 3DS 2.0.
5
Table 1: Operationalization.
Variable Levels
IV: machine data 0 := intact
1 := overwritten
IV: value 0 := low ($13)
1 := high ($406)
IV: region 0 := credit card home region (UK)
1 := foreign region (Germany)
DV: challenged 0 := passed (User passed without password authentication)
1 := challenged (User was challenged with password authentication)
DV: declined 0 := accepted (Transaction was accepted)
1 := declined (Transaction was declined)
DV: blocked 0 := continued (Credit card continued to be active)
1 := blocked (Credit card was blocked by the bank)
Our experiments require manipulating IV’s
(machine data, value, region). Manipulating ma-
chine data requires the communication between the
payment initiator’s browser WB, the merchant and
the card issuer to be intercepted (breakpoint in Fid-
dler terminology). We achieve this by placing an
HTTP application proxy on the payment initiator’s
device (i.e., our own machine), as we describe be-
low.
The HTTP application proxy tool that we use is
Fiddler available at [12]. Fiddler allows us to add
breakpoint to alter the data before it is forwarded
from WB to the communicating server. In Figure 3
the arrow labelled ‘1’ adds a breakpoint when the
user navigates to the payment URL on the merchant
website ‘hps.datacash.com’, and the arrow labelled
‘2’ points to where we edit the communication data
to the merchant. Using this platform, we are able
(i) to sniff the communication, (ii) control the input
to WB, and (iii) control the output from WB.
To alter the machine data, we add two break-
points. First, when the payment initiator click the
‘Pay’ button on the merchant website. This is to
modify the HTTP headers flowing from WB to the
merchant. The second breakpoint we add is when
card issuer connects to WB to fetch the browser fin-
gerprint. This is to change the machine data. We
alter the HTTP headers and the base-64 string of
WB device fingerprint with that of recorded by Fid-
dler from a machine with different browser finger-
print. Collectively, we made 64 3DS 2.0 enabled
transactions over two websites argos.co.uk and bm-
stores.co.uk, and over ranging transaction values of
$13 and $406.
Collectively, we made 64 3DS 2.0 enabled trans-
actions over two websites argos.co.uk and bm-
stores.co.uk, and over ranging transaction values of
$13 and $406. To our experiments we studied the
impact of fraud-detection decisions by performing
transactions from two regions. Firstly by keeping
the transaction region local to the country of where
credit card is issued (UK) and region foreign to the
credit card (Germany).
5 Method
The study—its statistical hypotheses and analysis
plan—have been preregistered at the Open Science
Framework (OSF)2 prior to any statistical analysis.
Analyses, graphs and statistical reporting in this pa-
per were computed directly from the data using the
R package knitr. The OSF repository includes the
dataset and its Datacite 4.0 meta-data description.
5.1 Sampling
In a repeated-measures experiment, four differ-
ent payment cards (three Visa and a MasterCard)
were used to make Card Not Present (CNP) pay-
2DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/X6YFH; https://osf.io/
x6yfh/
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Figure 4: Reverse engineering set-up, intercepting
3DS 2.0 transactions through a proxy.
ment transactions. We, thereby, sampled CNP pay-
ment transactions with 3DS-2.0-enabled home ap-
pliance Web sites (specifically: argos.co.uk and
bmstores.co.uk). The sampling frame was created
by enumerating combinations of cards and Web
sites, which were then exposed to different condi-
tions.
5.2 Procedure
We manipulated the three IVs (machine data,
value, region). To manipulate the machine data,
we intercepted the communication between the pay-
ment initiator’s browser WB, the merchant and the
card issuer. We achieve this by placing Fiddler on
the payment initiator’s device (i.e., our own ma-
chine). Fiddler allows us to add breakpoint to al-
ter the data before it is forwarded from WB to the
communicating server. Using this platform, we are
able (1) to sniff the communication, (2) to control
the input to WB and (3) to control the output from
WB.
5.2.1 Manipulation
Machine Data To alter the machine data, we add
two breakpoints. First, when the payment initiator
click the ‘Pay’ button on the merchant website. This
is to modify the HTTP headers flowing from WB
to the merchant. The second breakpoint we add
is when card issuer connects to WB to fetch the
browser fingerprint, as shown in Figure 4. This is
to change the machine data. We alter the HTTP
headers and the base-64 string of WB device finger-
print with that of recorded by Fiddler from a ma-
chine with different browser fingerprint.
Value To change the value of the transaction, we
selected and purchased items that either cost $13 or
$406.
Region We kept the transaction either in a region
local to the country of where credit card is issued
(UK) or a region foreign to the credit card where
the transactions were made from Germany.
5.2.2 Measurement
We coded the outcomes of transactions on a nomi-
nal scale, either as ‘0’ or ‘1’, depending on whether
the user could proceed with the transaction or was
interrupted. This outcome was obtained from the
response of the 3DS protocol to the browser.
We classified interruptions manually, based on
(1) whether the user was challenged with a pass-
word authentication (challenged), (2) whether the
card transaction was declined (declined), and
(3) whether the payment card was blocked alto-
gether (blocked).
5.3 Ethics
The experiment was run in accordance with the re-
quirements of the institution’s ethical review board
and an ethics case signed off.
The payment cards used belonged to one of the
experimenters, who exercised informed consent in
volunteering the cards for the experiment. The card
holder was aware that repeated transactions as done
in this experiment may impact future payment be-
havior of the card.
The card transactions were made by the card
holder, and the relevant personal identifiable infor-
mation not stored outside of the holder’s control.
The transactions were done manually, over a
longer timeframe, and restricted to at most 100
transactions, thereby, limiting the impact on the
fraud detection efforts of providers, banks and 3DS.
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6 Results
The statistics were computed with a significance
level of α = .05. As a common approach, we con-
ducted binomial logistic regressions with the depen-
dent variables as response and a target model in-
cluding all independent variables.
6.1 Common Analysis Approach
For each dependent variable, we created a logistic
regression that is to quantify the change in likeli-
hood caused by the different predictors.
Model Significance and Fit The first question
is, whether a selected model is a valid and well-
fitting model, at all. We checked overall model
significance with the Wald test, checked for signifi-
cant higher-level interactions, and selected the final
model using the Akaike Information Criterion cor-
rected for small samples (AICc). Thereby, we ascer-
tained that the selected model contains substantial
evidence vis-a`-vis of the minimal-AIC model and
substantiated its suitability with a goodness-of-fit
check.
While we aimed for a full model with all predic-
tors as specified in the pre-registration, we checked
that the model is actually defensible. While this was
the case for the models on the user being challenged
and on the transaction being declined, we found that
for the card being blocked, there was not enough ev-
idence to vouch for the full model. Here, we have
selected a model only with the core predictors, as an
alternative.
Impact of Predictors We computed odds ratios
and 95% confidence intervals thereon for effects of
significant predictors. Odds ratios are an effect size
of choice for logistic regressions. They quantify the
multiplicative change in likelihood of the of the out-
come, given a change in one predictor and every-
thing else being equal. We may say, “Other pre-
dictors held constant, a change in transaction value
makes a rejection five times as likely.”
It is important to note that this multiplicative
change is with respect to a baseline specific for each
model. Hence, similar odds ratios in different mod-
els might lead to different absolute likelihoods of
outcomes, given selected interventions.
Scenario Probabilities We also discuss the abso-
lute likelihoods of outcomes for particular scenar-
ios. Hence, then we factor in the odds ratios of
active predictors and obtain the overall likelihood
in that situation. In this case, we consider combi-
nations of predictors being manipulated and offer a
likelihood estimate for the outcome. Here we may
say that “In a foreign region, the transaction is 99%
likely to be declined if the machine data is faulty.”
Model Evaluation Finally, we evaluated each
model with regression diagnostics as well as accu-
racy (prediction vs. observation). We computed re-
peated 10-fold cross-validations with the R package
caret (with 10 repetitions).
6.2 Logistic Regression: User Chal-
lenged
We computed a binomial logistic regression to test
whether the independent variables impact the likeli-
hood of challenged as response.
Model Selection The model with all five predic-
tors was statistically significant, χ2(5) = 21.593,
p < .001. We checked for second-level and third-
level interactions wrt. the manipulated independent
variables and found none.
This model yields an Akaike Information Cri-
terion corrected for small sample sizes of AICc =
69.73. Compared to the best model only includ-
ing the predictors with the greatest residual drop
(machine data, value, and region), this fitted model
experiences a small enough information loss (∆ =
1.14) to be classified as having substantial support.
Goodness of Fit We computed a likelihood-ratio
test to compare the full model selected against the
one with minimal AICc (and fewer predictors). We
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the reduced
model is true, and, hence, keep the full model. We
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report the goodness-of-fit in different variants of
Pseudo-R2 in Table 2. McFadden’s R2 = .28.
6.2.1 Fitted Model
Predictors and Odds Ratios Table 2 offers an
overview estimates of the selected model.
There was a statistically significant positive im-
pact of overwriting the machine data on the user be-
ing challenged with a password, z = 2.6, p = .009,
OR= 6.64, 95% CI [1.7,31.7]. Everything else be-
ing equal, a user whose machine data is corrupted is
6.6 times as likely to be challenged with a password
authentication.
A change of the value of a transaction from low to
high had a statistically significant effect on the user
being challenged, z = 2.12, p = .034, OR = 4.47,
95% CI [1.2,19.9]. The increase in value from $13
to $406 made it 4.5 times as likely to be challenged.
The region being changed to a foreign country
had a statistically significant impact on being chal-
lenged with a password authentication, z= 2.6, p=
.009, OR = 6.64, 95% CI [1.7,31.7]. A change in
region to Germany made it 6.6 times as likely.
Given these results we reject the null hypotheses
H0,X ,challenged for X ∈ {machine data, value, region
}.
Scenario Probabilities We display the response
plots of the different predictor variables in Fig. 5 on
p. 10. Note that given the similar odds ratios of the
predictors, we expect the response and overlay plots
below to look rather similar to one another.
In Fig. 6, we overlay by region the likelihoods of
changing machine data or value, respectively. Over-
all, we observe that the probability of being chal-
lenged while being in home region of the card is
less than 5% when neither machine data nor value
are manipulated. Should either of the two predic-
tors be changed (machine data overwritten or the
value high), the probability of being challenged is
less than 20%.
If the card does a transaction from the foreign re-
gion, the situation is quite different. Here, the card
will challenge the user at probability of 20% or 25%
even if machine data are intact and the value low.
Should either of the two variables be manipulated,
the user will be challenged at a probability of around
60%.
6.2.2 Model Evaluation
Diagnostics There were two cases with large
residuals, but DFbetas were well below .5. There
were no cases with large leverage. Assessing for
multicollinearity, we found the Variance Inflation
Factors (VIFs) all close to 1, with a mean VIF of
1.09.
Performance Having computed a observation-
vs.-prediction classification, we found that the
regression had an accuracy of 73%, Hosmer-
Lemeshow not rejecting the fit, HLC χ2(8) = 10.77,
p= .215.
Cross-Validation We computed a repeated 10-
fold cross-validation on the same dataset. This
means, that the dataset was partitioned into 10 parts,
that the model was then re-computed using 9 parts
as training data (with NT = 57±1), and used to pre-
dict the observations of the 10-th part.
The cross-validation yielded an accuracy of 71%,
95% CI [67%,74%]. With a Cohen’s κ = .25, we
consider the cross-validation accuracy as low.
6.3 Logistic Regression: Transaction
Declined
We computed a binomial logistic regression with
the independent variables as predictors and the
transaction being declined as response variable.
Model Selection The model including all predic-
tors was statistically significant, χ2(5) = 44.409,
p < .001. Second-level and third-level interactions
between manipulated variables were not statistically
significant.
This model comes with a corrected Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion AICc = 57.72. Compared to the
min-AICc model with the predictors machine data,
value, region, and card, the fitted model has an in-
formation loss of ∆ = 2.3. This is which past the
9
Table 2: Logistic Regression: User Challenged
Estimate SE z-value p-Value
(Intercept) -2.981 1.021 -2.921 .003∗∗
Machine.Data 1.893 0.727 2.602 .009∗∗
Value 1.498 0.705 2.125 .034∗
Region 1.893 0.727 2.602 .009∗∗
Website -0.219 0.663 -0.330 .741
Card -0.563 0.312 -1.805 .071
Note: Overall Model: Wald χ2(5) = 21.593, p< .001
R2= .28 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .29 (Cox & Snell), .41 (Nagelkerke)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Machine Data
(a) Change of Machine Data
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Region
(b) Change of Region
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Value
(c) Change of Value
Figure 5: Probability(challenged) depending on significant predictors.
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threshold of substantial support, but still considered
good evidence.
Goodness of Fit Comparing the min-AICc model
with the chosen model on goodness-of-fit, we
find that a likelihood-ratio test does not reject the
null hypothesis. We report the goodness-of-fit in
Pseudo-R2 in Table 3. McFadden’s R2 = .50.
6.3.1 Fitted Model
Predictors and Odds Ratios We are offering an
overview of all estimates in the regression Table 3.
Overwriting the machine data has a statistically
significant impact on the transaction being de-
clined, z = 3.12, p = .002, OR = 18.99, 95% CI
[3.7,162.2]. Everything else being equal, overwrit-
ing the machine data made it 19 times as likely to
get the transaction declined.
There was a statistically significant effect of the
value of the transaction on it being declined, z =
3.41, p < .001, OR = 29.88, 95% CI [5.4,292.9].
Other predictors held constant, increasing the value
to $406 made it 29.9 times as likely to have transac-
tion declined.
The region had a statistically significant effent on
the transaction being declined, z = 3.41, p < .001,
OR = 29.88, 95% CI [5.4,292.9]. Other predictors
constant, a change to the foreign region (Germany)
made it 29.9 times as likely to have transaction de-
clined.
We thereby reject the null hypotheses H0,X ,declined
for X ∈ { machine data, value, region }.
In addition to these predictors, the card used also
had a statistically significant effect on the transac-
tion being declined.
Scenario Probabilities We are giving an
overview of regression (response and overlay)
graphs for the transaction-declined regression in
Figures 7 and 8 on p. 13.
As expected, the response graphs shown in Fig. 7
are similar due to the similar odds ratios of the pre-
dictors in question.
We consider the overlay of [machine data or
transaction value] by region in Fig. 8.
In the home region, we observe that the probabil-
ity to get a transaction declined in below 5%, if ma-
chine data and value stay at control level. If either of
them are changed to machine data being overwrit-
ten or the value increased, we expect a probability
of about 50% to get the transaction declined.
Once the user requests a transaction from the for-
eign region, the probabilities are not in the user’s
favor. Everything else at control level, we expect a
probability of 50% to 60% of the transaction being
declined. If either the machine data is overwritten or
value is increased, it is almost certain for the trans-
action to be declined.
6.3.2 Model Evaluation
Diagnostics There were four cases with large
residuals, yet DFbetas shown to be below 1. There
were 12 cases with leverage just touching twice the
average leverage, however the DFbetas are consis-
tently less than 1 and Cook’s distance less than 0.1.
The VIFs are smaller than 2, where the mean VIF is
1.49.
Performance We have a classification accuracy
of 83%, Hosmer-Lemeshow not rejecting the fit,
HLC χ2(8) = 6.96, p= .540.
Cross-Validation The repeated 10-fold cross-
validation showed an accuracy of 78%, 95% CI
[75%,82%]. The model offers reasonably accuracte
predictions (Cohen’s κ = .57), with accuracy statis-
tically significantly greater than the no-information
rate, p< .001.
6.4 Logistic Regression: Card Blocked
We established a binomial logistic regression on the
impact of predictors machine data, value and re-
gion on the credit card being blocked.
Model Selection We have a scenario in which the
model including only value and region has the min-
imal AICc = 40.39.
The full model including the three other predic-
tors (AICc = 44.71) yields an information loss of
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Figure 6: Probability(challenged) depending on [machine data or transaction value] by region. (The blue
line on the bottom shows the home region, the red line on the top the foreign region)
Table 3: Logistic Regression: Transaction Declined
Estimate SE z-value p-Value
(Intercept) -6.333 1.709 -3.706 < .001∗∗∗
Machine.Data 2.944 0.944 3.119 .002∗∗
Value 3.397 0.996 3.410 < .001∗∗∗
Region 3.397 0.996 3.410 < .001∗∗∗
Website 0.285 0.757 0.376 .707
Card 0.975 0.398 2.449 .014∗
Note: Overall Model: Wald χ2(5) = 44.409, p< .001
R2= .50 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .50 (Cox & Snell), .67 (Nagelkerke)
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Figure 7: Probability(declined) depending on significant predictors.
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Figure 8: Overlay Plot: Probability(declined) depending on [machine data or transaction value] by region.
(The blue line on the bottom shows the home region, the red line on the top the foreign region)
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∆ = 4.32, having considerably less support. Given
the data, this model only carries a likelihood of 1%.
Even though the likelihood-ratio test does not
reject the null hypothesis, we consider the model
with value, region andmachine data as robust al-
ternative (AICc = 41.05). In comparison with the
minimal-AICc model, we have an information loss
of ∆ = 0.67, yielding substantial evidence. Hence,
we select this model.
Goodness of Fit We evaluate a likelihood-ratio
test to check the goodness-of-fit of the min-AICc
model vis-a`-vis the chosen model. It did not re-
ject the null hypothesis. Table 4 contains customary
Pseudo-R2 estimates. McFadden’s R2 = .45.
6.4.1 Fitted Model
Predictors and Odds Ratios We offer an
overview of the predictor estimates and p-values in
Table 4.
The only predictor statistically significantly im-
pacting the likelihood of the card being blocked was
the region, z = 1.23, p = .217, OR = 2.99, 95%
CI [0.6,19.8]. A change from the card’s home re-
gion (UK) to the foreign region (Germany) made it
3 times more likely to get the card blocked.
We thereby failed to reject the null hypotheses
H0,X ,blocked for X ∈ { machine data, value, region
}.
6.4.2 Model Evaluation
Diagnostics There was one case with high resid-
uals, but DFbetas smaller than 1. There were 9
cases with a leverage past the double-mean-leverage
threshold. Inspecting DFbetas, we find them to be
below 1, and inspecting the cooks distance, we find
it below 0.2 max. The VIF was consistently close
to 1, with a mean VIF of 1.04.
Performance The classification accuracy was
73%, Hosmer-Lemeshow not rejecting the fit, HLC
χ2(8) = 1.78, p= .987.
Cross-Validation The repeated 10-fold cross-
validation yielded an accuracy of 84%, 95% CI
[81%,87%], Cohen’s κ = .40.
6.5 Overall Model Properties
The three selected models stay valid with each p<
.001 under Bonferroni-Holm correction for multi-
ple comparisons. The selected models show a clas-
sification accuracy of 73%− 83%, with a passable
fit. At the same time, the cross-validation accu-
racy was low to medium, which makes the selected
models less useful as predictive classifiers for other
datasets.
7 Discussion
The discussion is best seen in context of the likeli-
hood plots of Figures 5 and 7 on pp. 10 and 13.
7.1 The overall likelihoods of outcomes
differ characteristically.
From the quantification on likelihoods obtained
from the logistic regressions, we can observe a con-
sistent order of likelihoods. It was most likely for
a transaction to be rejected especially in a foreign
region. It seems that 3DS is taking no chances in
the case of either the machine data being corrupt or
the value being too high: the that transactions are
declined is all but certain.
It is noteworthy that the likelihood to decline
transactions was consistently higher in foreign and
home regions alike than the likelihood to challenge
the user with a password authentication. There
seems to be a prioritization of user convenience in
the sense creating less interruptions in payment flow
overall.
Of the three outcomes considered, the card being
blocked had the lowest effect size (odds ratio), that
is, 3DS seems least likely to have a card blocked as
ultima ratio. Of course, this makes sense given the
hassle for consumers and banks alike to get a card
unblocked or a new card issued.
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Table 4: Logistic Regression: Card Blocked
Estimate SE z-value p-Value
(Intercept) -22.798 2855.831 -0.008 .994
Value 20.194 2855.830 0.007 .994
Region 2.327 0.951 2.447 .014∗
Machine.Data 1.096 0.888 1.234 .217
Note: Overall Model: Wald χ2(3) = 26.358, p< .001
R2= .45 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .34 (Cox & Snell), .56 (Nagelkerke)
7.2 The three independent variables
have an effect in the same order of
magnitude.
For being challenged and the transaction declined,
we find that the three interventions investigated
(overwriting machine data, changing to a foreign re-
gion, or increasing the transaction value) all yielded
an impact on the respective outcome with a change
in likelihood roughly in the same order of mag-
nitude. Hence, we conclude that 3DS takes into
account all three variables in its decision making
process and that the variables are roughly equally
weighted.
It is important to note, however, that the variables
are not KO criteria: If something is amiss in only
one of those variables, the outcome will just be bi-
ased towards the user being challenged or the trans-
action being declined. However, only if two vari-
ables come together in a deviation from the norm
(machine data intact, home region, value relatively
low) then the likelihood of a 3DS intervention is
predicted to be more than 50%.
7.3 The impact of the region is consis-
tently strong.
Having said that the three variables seem to have an
impact of equal order of magnitude, it seems that
the region still ranks first among them, consistently
being in the first effect-size rank. This becomes es-
pecially apparent when looking at the “by region”
plots presented in Figures 6 and 8 on pp. 12 and 13.
Here, we see that the change from home to for-
eign region impacts the likelihood of a negative out-
come more strongly than the combined changes in
likelihood caused by problems with machine data or
transaction value.
7.4 The impact of the card used
seemed consistently weak.
While we used four different payment cards from
different providers in the experiment, we found con-
sistently low effect sizes on the impact of the card
used.
7.5 Limitations
7.5.1 Generalizability
We are the first to state that the generalizability of
this experiment is somewhat limited. In terms of ex-
periment design, this is rooted in a small number of
credit cards, card providers and merchant sites be-
ing evaluated. Furthermore, the different payment
cards used were linked to a single card holder.
While the card being used generally was linked
to a comparatively low effect size, the experiment
was thereby not prepared to discern whether 3DS
and payment card institutions personalize their re-
sponses to the card holder.
To gain a quantification of the impact of differ-
ent card holder profiles on the outcomes, one would
need a wide range of participants with different
credit card histories, which was beyond the scope
of this study.
While such future research might yield interest-
ing results, it comes with ethical caveats that partic-
ipants might expose their credit card accounts with
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a host of failed transactions, which in turn could im-
pact the future behavior of their payment cards.
7.5.2 Sample Size & Power
Operating on live credit cards owned by real peo-
ple, we saw a need to exercise restraint how many
transaction we would run.
We computed the logistic regressions with a sam-
ple of N = 64 and a maximal number of predictors
k = 5.
An a priori power analysis with G*Power based
on a presumed H1 probability of 50% and a pre-
sumed H0 probability of 20% for the impact of one
predictor (assuming the others to have R2 = .3),
highlighted a need of a minimal sample size of
Nˆ = 55 to reach 80% power.
We are aware that we are operating below the
rule-of-thumbs limits of sample sizes used for bi-
nomial logistic regressions. We accepted that we
accepted that in terms of sensitivity, we could only
detect effect of OR ≥ 4 at 80% power. To be pru-
dent operating at this small a sample size, we used
the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc)
for the model selection and profile-likelihood limits
for the interval estimation on odds ratios (both said
to be superior for small sample sizes).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first attempt to quan-
tify back-end decision making process of 3-D Se-
cure (3DS). Considering the 3-D Secure decisions
as probabilistic, we have employed an empirical ex-
periment to evaluate to what extent different devi-
ations from the norm (overwriting machine data,
leaving a payment card’s home region, or increas-
ing the value of the transaction) change the likeli-
hood of a “negative” outcome for the user.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
employ logistic regression to quantify the changes
in likelihood in the outcomes of the 3DS decision,
that is, whether the user is challenged with a pass-
word authentication, whether the transaction is de-
clined, or whether the card is blocked altogether.
Overall, we observed that the likelihood of the
different outcomes follow different distributions,
transactions declined being the most likely, card
blocked the least. While all predictors showed the
same order of magnitude on the biasing the decision
to a “negative” outcome, we found that the impact
of the region was consistently in the first rank.
While this study is limited in its scope and the
sample size too small to obtain accurate predictive
logistic regression classifiers for other datasets, we
believe that the result is an interesting first step. By
itself, it already offers insights in the characteristics
of the 3-D Secure decision making in the back-end,
normally shrouded from the user.
8.1 Future Work
So far, we have considered each line of outcomes
separately. Of course, these analyses do not take
into account the interplay between dependent vari-
ables. As future work, we anticipate it to be fruitful
to analyze 3-D Secure either with a multinomial lo-
gistic regression or hidden model estimation.
To evaluate the impact of personalized user pro-
files on payment card transactions governed by 3-D
Secure, future work could include a large-scale ex-
periment with many participants and a diversity of
card payment histories.
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